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WHY “REDEFINING STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE” WILL NOT
IMPROVE REPRODUCIBILITY AND COULD MAKE THE
REPLICATION CRISIS WORSE
HARRY CRANE
Abstract. A recent proposal to “redefine statistical significance” (Benjamin, et al. Nature
Human Behaviour, 2017) claims that false positive rates “would immediately improve”
by factors greater than two and replication rates would double simply by changing the
conventional cutoff for ‘statistical significance’ from P < 0.05 to P < 0.005. I analyze
the veracity of these claims, focusing especially on how Benjamin, et al neglect the effects
of P-hacking in assessing the impact of their proposal. My analysis shows that once P-
hacking is accounted for the perceived benefits of the lower threshold all but disappear,
prompting two main conclusions:
(i) The claimed improvements to false positive rate and replication rate in Benjamin, et
al (2017) are exaggerated and misleading.
(ii) There are plausible scenarios under which the lower cutoff will make the replication
crisis worse.
1. Introduction
The proposal to “redefine statistical significance” [2] (henceforth abbreviated as the ‘RSS
proposal’ or simply ‘RSS’) is intended to counteract the so-called ‘reproducibility crisis’,
i.e., the disproportionate fraction of statistically significant scientific findings that cannot
be replicated by subsequent studies. In championing their proposal, the signatories of RSS
claim, “This simple step would immediately improve the reproducibility of scientific research
in many fields.” The authors go on to assert that “false positive rates would typically fall
by factors greater than two” and suggest that replication rates would roughly double under
their proposal.
In ignoring the effects of P-hacking on false positive rate and replication rate, RSS misses
the whole point of the reproducibility crisis. By appealing to the same formal technique and
empirical evidence [17] used to support the RSS proposal, I will unmask major conceptual
and technical flaws in the RSS argument.1 The analysis presented here is not a counter-
proposal to RSS, but rather a refutation which is intended to elucidate the proposal’s flaws
and therefore neutralize the potential damage which would result from its implementation.2
Our analysis may be seen as complementary to, but should not be read in any way as an
endorsement of, the critiques and alternative proposals by other authors [1, 12, 16, 21]. I
discuss this last point further in Section 5.
1The analysis in Section 4 is based on the replication study in [17], which was conducted on a sample of
97 results in psychology. I do not analyze the results in [3], which performs a similar study for findings in
experimental economics but for a much smaller sample of 18 studies.
2The analysis below focuses on the potential impact of the proposal concerning statistical ‘significance’. The
RSS proposal also includes a recommendation to regard findings with 0.005 < P < 0.05 as ‘suggestive’. The
motivation for this suggestion, its justification, and perceived impact are not clearly articulated in [2], and
thus will not be discussed further here.
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Figure 1. False positive rate (4) for different significance levels (α =
0.05, 0.005) and hacking rates (h = 0, 0.05, 0.15). Solid lines correspond
to false positive rate without P-hacking; dashed lines to FPR with h = 0.05
(i.e., 5% of all P-values are hacked); and dotted lines to FPR with h = 0.15.
Brief summary. P-hacking and the reproducibility crisis: like smoking and lung cancer,
one cannot be discussed without the other [7, 9, 22].3 Yet the RSS analysis does just that.
Because they do not intend their proposal to combat P-hacking directly, the advocates of
RSS seem to think that they can set it aside. But in ignoring the effects of P-hacking,
RSS arrive at overly optimistic projections and tout misleading conclusions about the “im-
mediate” benefits of their proposal. With P-hacking accounted for, we arrive at much
more realistic, and sobering, conclusions about the potential impact of redefining statistical
significance.
To foreshadow the analysis presented in Section 4, Figure 1 plots the false positive rate
(FPR) versus statistical power for different combinations of significance level and P-hacking
rate (i.e., the proportion of all P-values obtained by P-hacking). The solid lines, which
correspond to the traditional false positive rate in the absence of P-hacking (see Equation (1)
below), are also shown as part of [2, Figure 2]. These lines suggest a substantial improvement
to FPR under the reduced significance level: for statistical power of 0.80, false positive rate
3For simplicity, I use the term ‘P-hacking’ to refer to any unsound statistical practice used in justifying a
scientific finding by a significant P-value, including but not limited to “cherry-picking, P-hacking, hunting
for significance, selective reporting, multiple testing and other biasing selection effects” [15]. Most salient
for our purpose here is that P-values obtained by P-hacking do not warrant the same interpretation as the
standard theory assumes. To be clear, I do not use the term ‘P-hacking’ in a pejorative sense. For the
purposes it is employed here, P-hacking need not be intentional or done with malicious intent. What is
important, however, is that P-hacking cannot be ignored when studying the effect of the RSS and other
proposals on reproducibility.
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H0 true H0 false
Proportion φ (1− φ)
Reject αφ (1− β)(1− φ)
Not Reject (1− α)φ β(1− φ)
Table 1. Table showing the relative proportion of null hypotheses falling
under each possible combination of true/false and reject/not reject for a
family of statistical tests with Type-I error rate α, Type-II error rate β, and
prior odds (1− φ)/φ.
is projected to decrease from 0.38 to 0.06. But if 15% of all P-values are hacked,4 then the
false positive rate would decrease from 0.75 to 0.71, just a 5% improvement, as a result of
the lower cutoff. And even at the low end of our estimate for the prevalence of P-hacking
(i.e., h = 0.05), the false positive rate would only improve from 0.57 to 0.44. Regardless of
how much the false positive rate improves in relative terms, the end result (44%-71% false
positives) is hardly worth celebrating: the false positive rate is bound to remain much higher
than the suggested 0.06 level presented in [2]. In direct conflict to the main argument in [2],
Figure 1 illustrates in stark terms the deception lurking in the RSS argument and makes
clear that decreasing the significance level will hardly make a dent in the reproducibility
crisis.
The forthcoming analysis develops the framework from which Figure 1 is derived. Though
the analysis is set in the context of the RSS proposal, the principles underlying it are relevant
beyond the specific numbers (i.e., 0.05 versus 0.005) or methods under consideration (e.g.,
hypothesis testing, Bayes factors, confidence intervals, etc.). P-hacking and other forms
of statistical misuse and malpractice are endemic to science at all levels. Its role in the
reproducibility crisis cannot be ignored, especially when evaluating proposals such as the
one considered here.
2. Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST)
Under the Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) paradigm, a null hypothesis
(H0) is tested against an alternative hypothesis (H1) by computing a P-value, defined as
the probability (under a true null hypothesis) that a certain test statistic attains a value
as or more extreme than what is actually observed. Small P-values, which correspond to
observations that are unlikely to have occurred if the null hypothesis were true, are inter-
preted as evidence against H0. In fields adhering to the NHST paradigm, it is conventional
to ‘reject H0’ and confer the label of ‘statistical significance’ whenever a P-value falls below
a pre-described threshold 0 < α < 1.
The NHST protocol is prone to two types of error:
• Type-I error: rejecting H0 when H0 is true; and
• Type-II error: failing to reject H0 when H0 is false.
4The values of h = 0.05 and h = 0.15 in Figure 1 are chosen as the extreme estimates obtained in Section 4,
which based on the replication study in [17] suggests that between 5% and 15% of all P-values are hacked.
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Since, when H0 is true, the corresponding P-value is distributed uniformly on (0, 1), the
probability of a Type-I error (i.e., obtaining ‘P < α’ when H0 is true) is α. (In particular,
when α = 0.05, the probability of Type-I error in any given test is 0.05.) For a given Type-I
error probability, the Type-II error rate, denoted as β, is the probability of failing to reject
a false null hypothesis. The power is the probability 1 − β of correctly rejecting a false
null hypothesis. Though norms vary among disciplines, it is conventional in many fields to
tradeoff between Type-I and Type-II error by aiming for 80% power at the 5% significance
level. We use these as benchmarks in the empirical analysis below (see Section 4).
2.1. False positive rate. For a collection of statistical tests, the false positive rate (FPR)
is the proportion of significant P-values (with P < α) obtained under a true null hypoth-
esis. Since FPR reflects the proportion of significant P-values obtained in a collection of
hypothesis tests, it depends on the proportion φ of all tests for which H0 is true, in addition
to the Type-I and Type-II error rates. (The proportion φ is sometimes quoted in terms of
the prior odds (1 − φ)/φ in favor of H1, which is the relative proportion of false to true
null hypotheses among all those tested.) For tests conducted under the standard protocol
with Type-I and Type-II error probabilities α and β and prior odds (1 − φ)/φ, the false
positive rate is given by
(1) FPR(α, β, φ) = αφ
αφ+ (1− β)(1− φ) .
These quantities are summarized in Table 1.
2.2. Replication Rate. We consider a significant result (P < α) to be reproducible (or
replicable) if it is verifiable by subsequent testing. Attempts to replicate often appeal to
the same or similar statistical methods as the initial study, and are thus prone to the same
sources of statistical error. For a precise analysis of the replication rate, we rule out the
possibility of Type-I and Type-II error in replication attempts and assume that 100% of
true positives and 0% of false positives are replicable.5 This assumption, which we call
perfect reproducibility, is in the spirit of the reproducibility discussion in that it treats
replication as a property of the finding itself: if the finding is true, then it is replicable; if
it is false, then it is not. Under perfect reproducibility, the replication rate for a family
of tests with significance level α, power 1 − β, and prior odds (1 − φ)/φ is the proportion
of true positives,
(2) RR(α, β, φ) = (1− β)(1− φ)
αφ+ (1− β)(1− φ) .
Comparing (1) and (2), we observe the complementary relationship between replication rate
and false positive rate,
(3) RR(α, β, φ) = 1− FPR(α, β, φ).
See Figure 2 for a plot of FPR and RR against power for significance levels 0.05 and 0.005.
5As a practical matter, this assumption is reasonable because replication studies typically seek to achieve
high power (> 90%) at the 0.05 significance level, minimizing the occurrence of false positives and false
negatives in replication attempts.
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Figure 2. Plot of false positive rate (solid) and replication rate (dashed)
at different levels of power for prior odds 1/10 at significance levels 0.05 and
0.005. The plot illustrates the complementary relationship between FPR
and RR under the perfect reproducibility assumption, as shown in (3).
3. NHST with P-hacking
When analyzing the impact of P-hacking on replication, it is important to distinguish
between the protocol of NHST and the policy for assigning the label of ‘statistical signif-
icance’ to small P-values. In a sound application of NHST, as assumed in Section 2, the
protocol used to obtain the P-value is independent of the policy for conferring statistical
significance. The calculations of false positive rate and replication rate in Section 2 are thus
valid in a world in which all P-values are obtained independently of the prevailing cutoff, as
the NHST paradigm prescribes. In such a world, all Type-I errors occur purely by chance,
with probability α, and both FPR and RR can be substantially improved by decreasing
the significance level while holding power fixed, or alternatively by increasing power while
holding significance level fixed, as Figure 2 indicates. That world is a far cry from the world
in which we live.
In the real world, many (and perhaps most) Type-I errors are the result of systematic
departures from the NHST protocol which cause the observed false positive rate to be much
larger than predicted by (1). (These systematic departures are referred to generically as
‘P-hacking’ here.) As a consequence, the standard theory of Section 2 can no longer be
applied to assess the false positive rate and replication rate in the presence of P-hacking.
To account for the effects of P-hacking, we distinguish between sound or unsound P-
values:
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• A sound P-value is one for which the standard interpretation is valid (i.e., the
probability, under the null hypothesis, that the test statistic attains a value as
extreme or more extreme than observed).
• An unsound (or hacked) P-value is one which does not warrant the above inter-
pretation because proper statistical protocol was not followed.
For our purposes here, neither the specific type of P-hacking (e.g., multiple testing, selec-
tive reporting, etc.) nor whether P-hacking was intentional is relevant. What matters is (i)
P-values obtained by P-hacking do not warrant the same interpretation as those obtained
under the standard paradigm and (ii) since P-hacking protocol depends on the policy (i.e.,
cutoff value), the effect of a new policy on hacked P-values cannot be studied empirically
based on data obtained under the present policy. When considering the likely behavior of
hacked P-values under the new cutoff, we cannot ignore that the scientific teams behind
these P-values have been successful both in obtaining a significant P-value at the current
significance level and in justifying why their hacked P-value gives a finding worthy of pub-
lication. When the significance threshold changes, we can expect that these same scientists
will still be successful in finding ways to obtain significant, publishable results. So, whereas
the behavior of sound P-values can be treated as absolute—by virtue of being sound their
behavior is unaffected by policy changes—the behavior of unsound P-values must be inter-
preted relative to the prevailing policy.6 For example, a hacked P-value of 0.045 under the
current 0.05 significance regime should not be expected to remain at 0.045 after the cutoff
changes to 0.005. By virtue of being hacked, this P-value is already smaller than it ought to
be, as a consequence of so-called ‘researcher degrees of freedom’. If the significance policy
were changed to 0.005, this same P-value should be expected to decrease, and would likely
end up below 0.005 upon further application of said degrees of freedom.
3.1. False positive rate and replication rate under P-hacking. The classification of
P-values as sound and unsound identifies two different regimes to consider when computing
FPR. Of all computed P-values, we write 0 < h < 1 to denote the proportion obtained by
unsound protocol (i.e., not according to the theory of Section 2). With 0 < α < 1 fixed as
a baseline significance level, we assume that this entire proportion h is significant at level
α when the prevailing significance cutoff is α.7 The remaining proportion 1− h of P-values
are sound and behave according to the analysis in Section 2.
The proportions of significant P-values of each type (i.e., sound true positive, sound false
positive, and unsound false positive) for a given choice of β and φ are now
(1− β)(1− h)(1− φ) : sound true positive
α(1− h)φ : sound false positive
h : unsound false positive.
6In making this observation, I do not mean to represent P-hacking as a universally malicious, subversive
activity by which ne’er-do-well scientists try to make a P-value as small as possible at all costs. In many
cases, scientists have been trained that what we are here calling P-hacking is a legitimate research technique.
I discuss practical matters of this sort in Section 5.
7In making this assumption, we ignore attempts at P-hacking which fail to obtain a P-value less than α.
Since these P-values are never labeled ‘significant’, they are assumed not to be observed in the scientific
literature and therefore do not contribute to the reproducibility crisis.
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H0 true H0 false
Sound Unsound Sound
Proportion φ(1− h) h (1− φ)(1− h)
Reject α(1− h)φ h (1− β)(1− h)(1− φ)
Not Reject (1− α)(1− h)φ 0 β(1− h)(1− φ)
Table 2. Table showing the relative proportion of null hypotheses corre-
sponding to true/false positives/negatives in the presence of P-hacking. The
proportion 1 − h of sound tests has Type-I error rate α, Type-II error rate
β, and prior odds (1 − φ)/φ. Table assumes α as the baseline significance
level, so that 100% of the proportion h of hacked P-values are significant at
level α. By setting h = 0, these proportions coincide with those in Table 1.
See Table 2 for a breakdown of these proportions.8 With the addition of h, the false positive
rate is now computed as
(4) FPR(α, β, φ;h) = α(1− h)φ+ h
α(1− h)φ+ (1− β)(1− h)(1− φ) + h.
Under the assumption of perfect reproducibility, we once again observe the complementary
relationship between false positive rate and replication rate
(5) RR(α, β, φ;h) = 1− FPR(α, β, φ;h).
By setting h = 0 we immediately recover (1), thus observing the precise sense in which the
calculations in Section 2 ignore P-hacking.
3.2. P-value distributions. To analyze how each of the three classes of significant P-value
at level α will behave upon lowering the cutoff to α/c, for c ≥ 1, we treat the behavior of
sound P-values as absolute—sound P-values do not depend on the policy used in determining
significance—and unsound P-values as relative—in the absence of other information, an
unsound P-value satisfying P < α when the cutoff is α should also be expected to satisfy
P < α/c when the cutoff is changed to α/c. The key point is that hacked P-values are not
hacked specifically to be below α. They are hacked to be below the significance threshold,
which just so happens to be α. When the threshold changes, so does the target, and likely
so will the P-value.
A key consideration when assessing the impact of a regime change is the extent to which
hacked P-values under one regime will persist (i.e., continue to be significant) under the
new regime. We write ψα/c(x), 0 < x < 1, to denote the proportion of hacked P-values in
the range (0, x) when the significance cutoff is α/c, for c ≥ 1. Since a hacked P-value is not
8Since the primary contribution to the reproducibility crisis is the disproportionate number of false positives
obtained by P-hacking, we also rule out the possibility of obtaining a ‘true positive’ via P-hacking. Under
perfect reproducibility, such findings would be reproducible, and thus would not contribute to reproducibility
issues.
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expected to increase in value upon lowering the cutoff, we assume that these distributions
are monotone with respect to significance level, in the sense that a hacked P-value which
is less than x at level α will also be less than x if the cutoff is decreased to α′ < α. Thus,
we assume ψα/c(x) ≥ ψα(x) for all c ≥ 1 and 0 < x < 1. In particular, by setting the
baseline significance level at α, we assume ψα/c(α) = 1 for all c ≥ 1, and hψα(α) = h is the
proportion of all P-values that are unsound and significant at level α.
For c ≥ 1, ψα/c(α/c) is the proportion of all hacked P-values which are significant when
the significance threshold is decreased to α/c. The proportion ψα/c(α/c) is central to our
assessment of the RSS proposal, as it quantifies the extent to which hacked P-values that
are significant at level α will persist (and remain significant) under the lower α/c cutoff.
The analysis in [2] compares the empirical replication rate for P-values with P < 0.005 and
0.005 < P < 0.05 observed in [3,17] to arrive at their suggested 2-to-1 increase in replication
rate under the lower cutoff. But since the behavior of hacked P-values depends on the
cutoff, we cannot naively estimate ψα/c(α/c) by ψα(α/c) (i.e., the proportion of hacked
P-values that lie below α/c when the cutoff is α). Instead, we should expect ψα/c(α/c) to
lie somewhere between ψα(α/c) and ψα(α), reflecting the inevitability that P-hackers will
adapt to the new significance regime.
Since ψα/c(α/c) depends on the cutoff α/c, we cannot estimate it from data observed
under the current α cutoff. When analyzing the potential impact of the lower cutoff, we
consider all possible values in the range ψα(α/c) ≤ ψα/c(α/c) ≤ ψα(α) by interpolation,
(6) ψα/c(α/c) = piψα(α) + (1− pi)ψα(α/c),
for 0 < pi < 1. The parameter pi quantifies the rate at which hacked P-values ‘persist’ after
a change in cutoff. We therefore call pi the persistence parameter and sometimes refer to
ψα/c(α/c) simply as the persistence at level α/c. Note that pi = 1 corresponds to maximal
persistence (i.e., ψα/c(α/c) = ψα(α) = 1), so that 100% of hacked significant P-values
under the current cutoff are significant at the new cutoff; and pi = 0 corresponds to minimal
persistence (i.e., ψα/c(α/c) = ψα(α/c)) so that only those hacked P-values that currently
lie below α/c are significant at the new threshold.
3.3. False positive and replication rates under regime change. In taking α as the
baseline, we set ψα(α) = 1 so that the proportion of unsound significant P-values at level α
equals hψα(α) = h as in Table 2. Assuming h is independent of the cutoff, the proportion
of all hacked P-values that are significant at the new α/c cutoff is given by ψα/c(α/c), as
reflected in the updated proportions of Table 3. The cutoff-dependent distribution ψ of
unsound P-values now features in the calculation of false positive rate and replication rate
from (4) and (5) by
FPR(α/c, β, φ;h, ψ) =
(α/c)φ(1− h) + hψα/c(α/c)
(α/c)φ(1− h) + hψα/c(α/c) + (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h)
and(7)
RR(α/c, β, φ;h, ψ) = (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h)(α/c)φ(1− h) + hψα/c(α/c) + (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h)
.(8)
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Under α/c cutoff
H0 true H0 false
Sound Unsound Sound
Proportion φ(1− h) h (1− φ)(1− h)
Reject α(1− h)φ hψα/c(α/c) (1− β)(1− h)(1− φ)
Not Reject (1− α)(1− h)φ h(1− ψα/c(α/c)) β(1− h)(1− φ)
Table 3. Table showing the relative proportion of null hypotheses corre-
sponding to true/false positives/negatives in the presence of P-hacking with
persistence ψα/c(α/c) at level α/c. The proportion 1− h of sound tests has
Type-I error rate α, Type-II error rate β, and prior odds (1− φ)/φ.
The assumed form of ψα/c in (6) and the convention ψα(α) = 1 implies ψα/c(α/c) ≥ pi,
giving the bounds
FPR(α/c, β, φ;h, ψ) ≥ (α/c)φ(1− h) + hpi(α/c)φ(1− h) + hpi + (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h)(9)
RR(α/c, β, φ;h, ψ) ≤ (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h)(α/c)φ(1− h) + hpi + (1− β)(1− φ)(1− h) ,
which we use to obtain conservative estimates in the forthcoming empirical analysis.
4. Analysis of “Redefining Statistical Significance”
For the sake of this analysis, we consider the potential effects of changing the baseline
significance level from α = 0.05 to α/c = 0.005. We take 0.80 as the conventional level of
power (i.e., β = 0.20) at significance level 0.05. We assume prior odds of 1/10 for results in
psychology, as suggested by empirical evidence in that field [10]. Since the analysis of FPR
(Equation (7)) under the change in cutoff relies on the persistence parameter pi which is not
estimable from data, we present all possible values of FPR over the entire range 0 < pi < 1
whenever applicable. Although it is possible that the prior odds could change in response
to redefining statistical significance, we assume for simplicity that φ will remain unchanged
upon lowering the cutoff to 0.005.
4.1. Estimating the hacking rate. In showing the sensitivity of FPR (and therefore
RR) to the rate of P-hacking (h), Figure 1 immediately raises doubts about the analysis
in [2]. The expressions of FPR and RR in (7) and (8), which account for P-hacking, allow
us to examine these doubts and arrive at the conclusions highlighted in the abstract and
introductory section. In particular, for 0.05 < h < 0.15, we see that the FPR is much higher
than suggested by the analysis in [2], and any improvement due to lowering the cutoff will
be minimal. To validate this observation, we estimate the hacking rate based on data from
a recent replication project in psychology [17].
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We obtain a range of estimates for h by comparing the empirical observations about
replication obtained in [17] with the predicted FPR and RR under P-hacking in (4) and
(5). The replication study in [17] shows an empirical replication rate of 37% (36 out of
97) in the field of psychology, far below the rate of 62% predicted by (2) with α = 0.05,
β = 0.20, and prior odds 10/11. Fitting this observed value to (5) gives a point estimate of
h = 0.075. By further comparing the observed replication rate among P-values which were
originally in the ranges P < 0.005 (24 out of 47) and 0.005 < P < 0.05 (12 out of 50), we
obtain estimates for h ranging between 0.05 and 0.15. These estimates are consistent with
the widespread belief that P-hacking is prevalent in the psychology literature.9
4.2. The impact of redefining statistical significance. Benjamin, et al cite two main
pieces of evidence in support of their proposal to change the significance cutoff from 0.05
to 0.005:
(i) The observation (partially reconstructed in Figure 1) that the false positive rate is
unacceptably high (greater than 0.33 for all levels of power) under the current 0.05
cutoff, and that these rates will fall to more acceptable levels (below 0.10 for many
levels of power) under the new 0.005 cutoff. Compare the solid lines in Figure 1,
also [2, Figure 2].
(ii) The empirical studies of replication rates in psychology [17] and experimental eco-
nomics [3] suggest that the replication rate for findings with P-value in the range
P < 0.005 is twice that of P-values in the complementary range 0.005 < P < 0.05.
Neither claim is valid. Claim (i) relies on theory (Section 2) which tacitly ignores P-hacking,
and thus does not apply in the context for which the RSS proposal was designed. Claim
(ii) ignores the dependence of ψα on the significance cutoff α, as supported by empirical
studies [9, 14, 20] and common sense (i.e., as P-hackers currently flout the prescribed pro-
tocol, knowingly or unknowingly, they should be expected to continue doing so when the
prescription changes). With the dependence of ψα on the significance cutoff accounted for,
we see that the suggested benefits of lowering the significance threshold (i.e., FPR decreases
by a factor greater than two and replication rate doubles) are far less certain than presented
in [2]. Quite simply, such projections are incongruous with reality.
Claimed benefits of the RSS proposal are exaggerated. Figure 3 shows how the false positive
rate will change (as a function of persistence pi) compared to several reference points. The
top dotted line in both figures is the FPR for h = 0.05 and h = 0.15 at the 0.05 significance
level. In both cases, the FPR is much higher than the standard theory predicts in the
absence of P-hacking (as given by the middle dotted line in both plots). The bottom dotted
line is the FPR predicted at significance level 0.005 in the absence of P-hacking. The solid
curve shows how FPR varies (at the 0.005 cutoff) with the persistence pi. To appreciate the
discrepancy between what can be expected in the presence of P-hacking and what is claimed
in [2], note the difference between the solid lines in Figure 3 and the bottom dotted line in
each plot, which represents the predicted FPR purported by the RSS analysis. Notice that
FPR under the new 0.005 cutoff will remain above 20% even if persistence is relatively low
(pi ≈ 0.25) and power is assumed to remain at 0.80 under the new cutoff. For high levels
9These estimates, which were obtained merely by matching theoretical and empirical values of replication
rate based on a single study, are not put forward here as estimates of the ‘real’ rate of P-hacking in psychology
or any other discipline. They are intended merely to provide a ballpark figure for the sake of analyzing the
RSS proposal in light of P-hacking.
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Figure 3. Solid lines show the projected false positive rates for h = 0.05
(left) and h = 0.15 (right) over the full range 0 < pi < 1 of persistence
parameters. Both plots assume α = 0.005, β = 0.20, and prior odds 1/10.
The plot on the left assumes h = 0.05 and the plot on the right assumes
h = 0.15. The dotted lines are the false positive rates computed under the
estimated value of h (top line) and by setting h = 0 for significance levels
0.05 (middle) and 0.005 (bottom).
of persistence (e.g., pi ≥ 0.50), the FPR is near or far above what would be expected under
the 0.05 level in the absence of P-hacking.
False positive rate will remain high under RSS. A finer grained analysis is given in Figure 4,
which plots FPR under different combinations of power and persistence ψ0.005(0.005). We
note that the analysis put forward by RSS in support of redefining the cutoff from 0.05 to
0.005 assumes h = 0, which for a power of 0.80 leads to a decrease in FPR from 0.38 (under
the 0.05 cutoff) to 0.06 (under the 0.005 cutoff). In the absence of P-hacking, the perceived
improvement is appealing in both relative (decrease by factor greater than 6) and absolute
(decrease false positive rate to 6%) terms. However, the improvements are substantially
mitigated in the presence of even modest P-hacking: for h = 0.05 and power of 0.80, FPR
decreases from 0.57 to 0.44; and for h = 0.15 and power 0.80, FPR decreases from 0.75 to
0.71. So if power can be maintained after the significance cutoff is decreased, then the false
positive rate will go down, but by much more modest factors (between 5% and 22%) which
are unlikely to be noticeable in practice and would still leave FPR at much higher levels
than desired.
The reproducibility crisis could get worse. So far we have granted the RSS proposal the
benefit of the doubt in assuming that power of 0.80 can be maintained after the change in
cutoff. This is possible, but not without additional costs (i.e., time and money) due to the
need of larger sample sizes. Even granting this benefit, the unimpressive improvements to
FPR shown in Figures 3 and 4 call into question the RSS assertion that the benefits of the
lower cutoff would outweigh the costs of achieving the same level of power. Furthermore,
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Figure 4. False positive rates under different combinations of power (1−β)
and P-hacking rate (h) for significance level 0.05 (left) and 0.005 (right). The
prior odds is taken to be 1:10 (i.e., φ = 10/11) in both cases and power at
the 0.05 level fixed at 0.80.
the practical difficulty of achieving such high power without compromising other parts of
the study cannot be ignored in fields such as psychology, where the reproducibility crisis
seems most pronounced. It seems inevitable that the power of many studies would decrease
under the new cutoff.
To examine the impact of a potential loss in power, Figure 5 plots the ratios of replication
rate for different choices of power (1− β) and persistence (ψ0.005(0.005)) to the replication
rate under the 0.05 level with power 0.80. Ratios smaller than 1 are colored red to indicate
that the replication rate gets worse under the lower cutoff of 0.005. As expected, the
replication rate improves as long as the same level of 0.80 power can be maintained at the
lower cutoff. But only under special circumstances does the ratio exceed 2, as the authors
suggest based on the empirical evidence in [3] and [17]. For the replication rate to double,
the persistence can be no greater than 0.35 (at power 0.80 and h = 0.15) and no greater
than 0.15 (at power 0.80 and h = 0.05). Based on these observations, it is hard to imagine
a circumstance under which the replication rate would improve by a factor greater than 1.5.
Since the RSS proposal takes no active step to combat the root cause of the reproducibility
crisis (i.e., P-hacking), it is unrealistic to expect P-hacking to improve in any noticeable
way under the new proposal. And if the same level of power cannot be maintained, then
the situation is even more uncertain, with most scenarios suggesting modest gains or even
losses in replication rate. For example, if power falls to 0.50 under the new 0.005 cutoff
and P-hacking persists at rate greater than 0.75, then replication rate could increase by as
much as 19% (at persistence 0.75 and h = 0.05) or decrease by 19% (at persistence 1 and
h = 0.15). The replication rate under the new cutoff would vary between 20% and 51% in
such a case, as can be compared to the 37% replication rate observed in [17].
4.3. How persistent are P-hackers? A determining factor in evaluating the impact of
the RSS proposal is the extent to which the lower cutoff will lead to a reduction in the
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Figure 5. Ratio of RR under 0.005 and 0.05 cutoffs based on the psychology
replication data. (Left) Shows ratio
RR(0.005, β, 10/11; 0.05, ψ0.005(0.005))
RR(0.05, 0.2, 10/11; 0.05, 1)
for different combinations of power 1 − β and persistence ψ0.005(0.005).
(Right) Shows ratio
RR(0.005, β, 10/11; 0.15, ψ0.005(0.005))
RR(0.05, 0.2, 10/11; 0.15, 1)
for different combinations of power 1−β and persistence ψ0.005(0.005). Ratios
less than 1 are colored in red, indicating that replication rate is worse under
the lower 0.005 cutoff.
proportion of hacked P-values that attain statistical significance. Since RSS takes no active
steps to deter P-hacking, it is unlikely to have any positive impact on the prevalence of
P-hacking. In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that ψ0.005(0.005) ≈ 1, in
which case the benefit to reproducibility would be undetectable or even negative if the
same level of power cannot be achieved: see the top line in Figure 5. Without compelling
evidence to the contrary, we should expect P-hacking to continue just as it is currently. The
authors of RSS have tried to preempt this criticism, arguing that “[r]educing the P-value
threshold complements—but does not substitute for—solutions to these other problems”
[2]. Based on our above analysis, however, we find little ‘complementary’ about the RSS
proposal. All available data points to a marginal improvement in FPR as long as the lower
significance level has no adverse effect on the level of statistical power (1−β), hacking rate
(h), or prior odds ((1− φ)/φ). This alone is a strong assumption. Whatever improvements
to reproducibility might result from the other efforts to thwart P-hacking will have been
achieved in spite of the RSS proposal.
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5. Concluding remarks
Using the same theoretical device (i.e., false positive rate under NHST) and empirical
evidence (i.e., the psychology replication study in [17]), we have analyzed the RSS proposal
in light of claims that it will improve reproducibility. By accounting for the effects of P-
hacking, we see that the claimed benefits to false positive rate and replication rate are much
less certain than suggested in [2]. In fact, if false positive rate were to decrease at all, it
will be virtually unnoticeable, and will remain much higher than claimed in [2]. Replication
rates will not come close to doubling unless the lower cutoff successfully eliminates all but a
small fraction of P-hacking. All available evidence suggests that P-hacking would continue
much as it is now, and replication rates would either improve marginally or even decrease
and would remain far below what is necessary to improve reproducibility in any substantive
way. Altogether, these observations point to one conclusion: The proposal to redefine
statistical significance is severely flawed, presented under false pretenses, supported by a
misleading analysis, and should not be adopted.
Defenders of the proposal will inevitably criticize this conclusion as “perpetuating the
status quo,” as one of them already has [13]. Such a rebuttal is in keeping with the spirit
of the original RSS proposal, which has attained legitimacy not by coherent reasoning or
compelling evidence but rather by appealing to the authority and number of its 72 authors.
The RSS proposal is just the latest in a long line of recommendations aimed at resolving the
crisis while perpetuating the cult of statistical significance [23] and propping up the flailing
and failing scientific establishment under which the crisis has thrived. The proposal to
redefine statistical significance is the status quo made by a group of authors who represent
the status quo: advocates of the proposal not only embrace the bureaucracy of ‘statistical
significance’ but also contribute to the status quo replication crisis by peddling an argument
grounded in unstated assumptions and incomplete analysis. This latter point cannot be
overstated: if the authors of this proposal, many of whom are prominent in their respective
fields and have been active in combatting the reproducibility crisis for years, are prone to
the same fundamental errors that are largely responsible for the replication crisis, then what
hope is there to stem the crisis in the scientific communities they lead?
While I am sympathetic to the sentiment prompting the various responses to RSS [1,12,
16, 21], I am not optimistic that the problem can be addressed by ever expanding scien-
tific regulation in the form of proposals and counterproposals advocating for pre-registered
studies, banned methods, better study design, or generic ‘calls to action’. Those calling for
bigger and better scientific regulations ought not forget that another regulation—the 5%
significance level—lies at the heart of the crisis.
Beyond their implications for the specific recommendation to redefine statistical signif-
icance, the subtle but severe issues with the RSS proposal call into question the role of
statistics in scientific research [5]. The past century has seen the steady rise of statistical
thinking as a method for validating scientific findings [18]. Statistics is now the sole ad-
judicator of what is ‘significant’ and what is not, what is scientific and what is not, what
is important and what is not. Other techniques have largely been phased out, slowly but
steadily [8, 19], to such an extent that it is now difficult, or impossible, in some fields to
describe what constitutes ‘knowledge’ without referring to the concept of statistical signif-
icance, or some similar statistical measure. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, science
finds itself in the midst of crisis.
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Viewed in this light, P-hacking and its consequences are seen for what they are: not
as a defective or fraudulent behavior but rather as a natural response to overbearing and
repressive regulation. For the practicing scientist, statistics is just one of many potential
ways to glean insights and validate findings. While some hypotheses may be properly
tested and understood by statistical reasoning, others might not be amenable to any formal
quantitative or statistical method. The rise of statistical thinking over the past century
[8, 18] has crowded out these other ways of arriving at truth, which despite being more
qualitative, less precise, and more ambiguous are no less valid. In such a parochial system,
what option other than P-hacking is available for the scientist who in earnest believes to
have come upon a veritable finding, which despite having a sound basis in logic and evidence
cannot be tested statistically?
I have commented before [4] about the need to break free from the modern data-crazed
mindset, which fetishizes the ‘statistical’ and brushes aside everything else. To borrow
from Feyerabend [6, p. 7], “The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything
goes”. Scientists ought to be encouraged to make convincing, cogent arguments for their
hypotheses however they see fit, without the decree of mandated protocol or embargoed
methods.
To be clear, I am not calling for a ‘ban’ of statistics—I am not calling for a ban of any-
thing. The reproducibility crisis exposes the vulnerability of relying too heavily on any one
paradigm, statistical or otherwise, and the folly of entrusting the arbitration of ‘knowledge’
to an enlightened intellectual bureaucracy which keeps the proletariat in check by ‘raising
awareness’, banning methods, and redefining what is significant. These vulnerabilities are
only magnified by the allure of publication, prestige, promotion, and the many other human
(all too human) factors whose influence is undeniable and inevitable. Against conventional
wisdom, I contend that the reproducibility crisis cannot be fixed by better statistical educa-
tion, increased awareness, patronizing ‘how to’ guides (e.g., [11]), or enhanced oversight by
journals and intellectual bureaucrats. These measures have been tried, and they have failed.
Such steps only accelerate bureaucracy, which in turn calcifies the status quo and further
promotes a collective inability to conceive of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ independently
of the bureaucratic policies used to evaluate ‘findings’. The only way to reverse course is
to loosen—not tighten—the restrictions on what makes an analysis scientific and a finding
significant.
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